UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 13 CR 30 (JSR) 4 5 EDGAR ENCARNACION-LAFONTAINE, Defendant. 6 7 8 New York, N.Y. April 3, 2015 3:05 p.m. 9 10 Before: 11 HON. JED S. RAKOFF, 12 District Judge 13 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 PREET BHARARA, United States Attorney for the 16 Southern District of New York EMIL J. BOVE III 17 Assistant United States Attorney 18 NATALI TODD 19 KAREN CHARRINGTON Attorneys for Defendant 20. 21 22 23 24 25

(Case called)

THE COURT: Will the parties please identify themselves for the record.

MR. BOVE: Good afternoon, your Honor. Emil Bove, for the government.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. TODD: Good afternoon, your Honor. Natali Todd, for Mr. Encarnacion, and also present with me is

Ms. Charrington and Mr. Encarnacion.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

We are here for sentence. Let me find out first: Are there any objections to the presentence report other than the numerous objections set forth in the parties' written submissions?

MR. BOVE: Not from the government, your Honor.

MS. TODD: Nothing additional, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

So let's deal with those objections. Most of them relate to the calculation under the guidelines, which of course the Court must take into account but it's not bound by in terms of the ultimate sentence.

The probation office calculates the offense level at 41, Criminal History Category of I, and a guideline range there of 324 to 405 months. The defense counsel calculates the offense level of 31, a criminal history category, everyone

agrees, of I, and a guideline range of 108 to 135 months. The government agrees with the probation calculation.

I'm in between, as follows:

First, with respect to the quantity of marijuana, the jury convicted Encarnacion of conspiring to distribute 100 kilograms or more, and while both probation and the government contend that at least a thousand kilograms of marijuana was involved, I think this greatly exaggerates what Encarnacion himself knew or reasonably foresaw was the scope of the conspiracy in terms of the weight of the drugs. So I calculated that, for sentencing purposes, as 100 kilograms.

Second, with respect to the cocaine quantity, there we had testimony -- not testimony but a confession earlier on from Encarnacion that one of the boxes that he confessed to having transported had 20 kilograms of cocaine. There was testimony that there were five boxes and that he saw at least three boxes, or at least Goris testified that he saw the three boxes of cocaine, and that Goris testified that he tallied the cocaine from, what he saw, as 70 packages, each containing one kilogram, and I accept that. And so I calculate the cocaine quantity as 70 kilograms.

The defense argues, while we're on the subject of this, because it relates also to mandatory minimums, that the defendant qualified for safety-valve eligibility. I think it's patently evident that Mr. Encarnacion did not truthfully

provide all information necessary to qualify for the safety valve, and so that application is denied.

With respect to enhancements, on the drug conspiracy group, with respect to the two-level enhancement for use of a threat, I think that that was implicit in statements that Encarnacion left in his voicemail with Goris, which Encarnacion said that he was not alone, that that he was going to find Goris and make him pay or make the family pay if Goris didn't come. This is all within the context of the statements made on the very night that Goris stole the money and therefore was part of the drug conspiracy. So I will award that enhancement.

With respect to the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice in the drug conspiracy, I never give that enhancement for testimony given on the stand, not because I thought Mr. Encarnacion was truthful on the stand -- I found his testimony untruthful -- but because, as a policy matter, I believe that the obstruction for giving false statements in testimony is seriously flawed in that it considerably chills people from taking the stand and, thus, while in this case the defendant was guilty, there are many innocent people who will be deterred from taking the stand because they are being told in advance by their lawyers that if the jury or the judge finds them untruthful, they will suffer a further enhancement for obstruction of justice. So as a policy matter, I do not award that enhancement. I have set out my reasoning for this in

greater length in written opinions that I have issued in other cases. So that will not be granted.

With respect to the three-level enhancement for committing an offense while on pretrial release, that is clearly warranted, and so that will be granted.

Turning to the other grouping for threats, the two-level enhancement for use of a threat is clearly called for there.

The one-level enhancement for quantity of funds demanded, Encarnacion says that he did not know the actual amount. And I think that the inferences that the government argues that he did are not sufficient, so I will not award that enhancement.

Again, with respect to the adjustment for obstruction of justice under the threats grouping, for the same reasons that I did not award it in the drug grouping, I don't award it in the threats grouping.

Finally, with respect to the three-level enhancement for committing an offense while on pretrial release, that clearly was called for and it will be granted.

So the result of all this is that when you take all those calculations and you take the grouping rules, you wind up with an offense level of 39 and, of course, a Criminal History Category of I, and a guideline range of 262 to 327 months.

Now, having said all that, no one who is familiar with

this Court will be surprised to hear that that is just a modest factor in how this Court will arrive at sentencing, given the Court's views of the sentencing guidelines in general and how they're arrived at, which this case and all these Mickey Mouse calculations well illustrates.

So, unless anyone has anything further they want to say on the calculation, let's turn to the real issue, which is what the sentence should be under Section 3553(a). And on that, I'll hear first from defense counsel, then from government counsel, and then from the defendant if he wishes to be heard.

MS. TODD: Thank you, your Honor.

The Court's resolution with respect to the objections to the presentence report has essentially shortened my argument tremendously. In saying that, I will rely primarily on my written submissions to the Court --

THE COURT: Yes, all your issues are preserved for appeal.

MS. TODD: Thank you.

But I will ask the Court, in sentencing

Mr. Encarnacion, to be reasonable in what the Court decides is

the appropriate sentence for him and to consider his personal

history and characteristics and be mindful of the principles of

fairness and proportionality.

Mr. Encarnacion is 47 years old. He's been in this

country for 37 years. Most of that time --

THE COURT: Let me take the liberty of interrupting.

And in this, what I am about to say, is something the
government may want to respond to as well when they get to
their portion of the colloquy.

Mr. Encarnacion previously entered a plea under which the guideline calculation would have been 151 to 188, I believe, or 180-something. And of course he might have gotten lower than that, that was just a guideline calculation, but he had every reason to believe, having negotiated that with the government, that that was something that he believed was, or his counsel believed was, a fair resolution, assuming arguendo that he was guilty of the crimes.

Now, he asserted he was not guilty of the crimes; and therefore I allowed him to withdraw his plea and go to trial. But he has now been found guilty of those crimes. And the probation office here, I think, in recognition of that, as well as all the other factors under Section 3553(a), which I must and do consider, recommended a sentence within that range, 151 months.

Now, I'm not sure it should be that low but I certainly don't see why it should be lower than that. That surely took account of a lot of the things you're arguing for now. Given the potential of a much, much greater guideline calculation, it was a fairly reasonable resolution that

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undoubtedly took account of the fact that he had no criminal history -- I also take account of that, I think that's important -- it took account of the fact that he had worked hard in various legitimate jobs, took account of his age, it took account of his family circumstances, all things that I also take account of and weigh in his favor.

But why would I want to go lower than 151?

MS. TODD: Well, your Honor, I don't think at the time that the plea agreement, prior plea agreement, was drafted, the government was fully aware of Mr. Encarnacion's history in terms --

THE COURT: What is it you think they didn't know about?

MS. TODD: Well, when you negotiate a plea, part of the consideration is that you are saving the government a tremendous amount of expense from going to trial, that's one consideration, and allowing a speedy resolution --

THE COURT: On that, of course, I should impose a higher penalty, right?

MS. TODD: No, because then that would be penalizing Mr. Encarnacion for exercising his constitutional right to go to trial.

THE COURT: It won't be penalizing him. It would be saying he's no longer entitled to the credit that he otherwise receives for saving the government all that time and effort,

which is right there in the guidelines, as you know. It's not regarded as a penalty under the law.

MS. TODD: Well, your Honor, I don't think that would be a fair assessment because ultimately he has to be punished for his role in the offense and the actual crime. And in doing so, a number of factors, some of which the Court has just listed, should be considered. We are talking about a 47-year-old man who within the hierarchy of the conspiracy --

THE COURT: Just so we're clear, you know we are not bound in any way, shape or form by the prior plea agreement.

It has been vacated and he went to trial, as was his right, and I was very happy to accord him that right. But just looking at it realistically, didn't that reflect, among other things, all the factors that you're now bringing to my attention?

MS. TODD: I don't think so, your Honor, because the guidelines are calculated based on numbers, in terms of enhancements, the amount of narcotics involved, a certain number of points are awarded for certain categories and --

THE COURT: Yes, of course on that, we have the calculation that we now have --

MS. TODD: Right.

THE COURT: -- that is 262 to 327 months. And the government would argue that, and the probation office argue, that it should have been even higher.

MS. TODD: I'm saying that the guideline calculation

in and of itself, even though it's a starting point, it's not per se reasonable.

THE COURT: I totally agree with that, I totally agree with that.

But now, for example, I do find, though I did not as a policy matter give an enhancement for this in terms of guideline calculation, but I do find he lied blatantly on the stand. Should I disregard that totally?

MS. TODD: I don't think -- no, your Honor, the Court should not disregard, the Court should consider all factors relevant to sentencing, and it's simply a matter ultimately what the Court considers to be fair and reasonable with respect to this individual in terms of the punishment that is sufficient for his crimes, in that it shouldn't be greater than necessary to punish him.

THE COURT: I agree.

MS. TODD: It shouldn't take away all hope of possibility.

THE COURT: I guess the point is this -- and let's forget about the false testimony altogether because, for the reasons I've already indicated, I think as a policy matter it's not a good idea to punish somebody for that. I just want the record to reflect that I wasn't blind to what I thought was his perjurious testimony. But I now know infinitely more about the facts of this case than I did at the time that we had the

pretrial proceedings. And a great deal of what I know is not very favorable to your client. So, in ignorance of all that, I might have been more sympathetic to some of the arguments you're now making but of course now I know all that.

Well, I'll come back to you, Ms. Todd, in just a minute. Let me hear from the government because the question I have for the government is this: The government had full knowledge of this case before it went to trial. The government clearly, by entering into a plea bargain that contemplated 151 to 180 or so months, which the government always supports the guidelines being their bible, the government clearly thought that that was sufficient to fulfill all the requirements of Section 3553(a), or they would not, in dereliction of their duty to see that justice is done, have entered into that plea.

So how can I give a higher sentence than that, when the government in effect told me, through their actions during the plea bargain, that that was sufficient?

MR. BOVE: Judge, the plea bargain in this case, we acknowledge that happened right on the eve of trial, of course. At the same time, the plea offer that was extended contemplated a number of considerations that we've raised at other times in these proceedings that were very important to us. And they relate to litigation risk and they relate to the human costs of calling as witnesses some of the lay witnesses who the defendant has now been convicted of conveying threats to. It

allowed the government, that plea offer allowed the government --

THE COURT: But surely that might be why you would not want the highest sentence that you might otherwise be able to achieve, but surely you would never, would you, enter into an agreement that allowed the defendant to receive a sentence that did not carry out the functions of Section 3553(a), would you?

MR. BOVE: I can't disagree with that statement. But I would also say that another reason I think the guidelines are different today than they were when we made that plea offer before the trial is that there were then a number of proceedings after that, and a lot of time elapsed and the investigation continued. So if we're focused on 3553(a), there are, we believe, additional aggravating factors that were identified post that plea and post even the withdrawal of that plea that bear on sentencing today. Some of them came up during the trial.

For instance, when Ms. Gomez from the DR testified about the phone call she received and the threat that there will be blood, I think it's fair at this point, at sentencing, your Honor will recall that there were some evidentiary objections to Facebook items that showed both unexplained wealth that appeared to be linked to the defendant in the Dominican Republic as well as associates that the defendant admitted during his testimony were his, possessing firearms,

all things that made his conduct in context, from our perspective, more serious.

I think we are at the point in the proceeding where we're talking about 3553(a), and I do think that there were some factors, even setting aside the human cost, the very real cost of having those lay witnesses come in to testify twice since then, that are aggravating and do warrant punishment at least where your Honor has calculated the guidelines here today.

THE COURT: All right. Let's go back to Ms. Todd.

MS. TODD: Just with respect to the last statements that Mr. Bove referred to regarding unexplained wealth: I know the government does not have any proof that the property that they referred to belonged to Mr. Encarnacion. That was his father's property. And I actually have the deed, which predated from 19 --

THE COURT: That doesn't play any role in my calculation.

MS. TODD: Right.

THE COURT: What does play a role with the Court is the very point that the prosecutor just made, which I do think was brought home vividly to the Court, which was the way

Mr. Encarnacion terrorized people like Ms. Gomez in furtherance of his threat conspiracy. That's very difficult to swallow.

MS. TODD: Just a moment, your Honor?

25 MS. TODD: Jus

THE COURT: Yes.

(Pause)

MS. TODD: Your Honor, my recollection of that particular phone call was no phone number, no voice recognition, and I understand it's circumstantial but that is, I think, a stretch to attribute that --

THE COURT: It's part, and I'm not just relying on just that, although I don't regard it as a stretch at all, but I think there was plenty of evidence, as the jury in effect found, that Mr. Encarnacion --

MS. TODD: The question --

THE COURT: -- is not above making implicit physical threats, not just to people he's trying to get money back from, both to their family and to others, an entirely despicable conduct on his part.

MS. TODD: May I, your Honor?

THE COURT: Of course.

MS. TODD: The question to the government was, or at least my interpretation is, what did they not know at the time of the plea that they learned later. The government's position from day one was that Mr. Encarnacion made the threats, was responsible for the Facebook threats. We have all of the documentation with respect to the specific language that was used in those Facebook communication. They had all of the phone calls, they had spoken with respect to the marijuana

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conspiracy, they had been speaking with and meeting with the Herrera brothers for a substantial amount of time and knew the scope of the conspiracy.

So I'm not sure that there was any additional information in terms of the plea that was offered then that was different than came out at trial. They were aware of all of that information and, with that information, determined that the plea that they offered was sufficient.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else that you wanted to add?

MS. TODD: Judge, I'll rely on my submission. I'll just ask the Court to be very reasonable. I think, at the very least, the mandatory minimum of ten years is a substantial sentence for this 47-year-old man, who has never had any prior contact with the criminal justice system. He will be deported. He has lost everything he has worked for, having been in this country for over 37 years, and he will be starting from the ground up at whatever age that is past middle age, at whatever sentence the Court decides, even with a mandatory minimum sentence. So I'm asking the Court to be very reasonable and consider that Mr. Encarnacion was not a leader, a manager, and he was not running the operation.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Let me hear from Mr. Encarnacion if he wishes to be

heard.

(Pause)

THE COURT: I see him shaking his head, no so I take it he doesn't wish to be heard.

MS. TODD: He does not wish to. He relies on his letter to you.

THE COURT: All right.

This sentence presents -- it presented for the probation office and it presents to this Court -- some interesting policy issues. No matter how you look at what Mr. Encarnacion did, you cannot help but recognize that the guideline calculations are absurdly high. Under the probation office calculation, which the government agreed with, the calculation was 324 to 405 months -- in other words, 30 years or so -- for a gentleman who was, under any circumstance, a relatively modest participant in these conspiracies.

Even under my calculations, the guideline range is 262 to 327 months, in other words, 26, 27 years, something like that. All this illustrates, in the Court's view, is how totally out of whack the guidelines are with any fair appraisal of the individual circumstances and the individual role of this defendant.

Of course, the Court is bound by the mandatory minimums since I find he didn't qualify for the safety valve, but the dilemma that to some extent the Court confronts is

that, while I strongly feel that Mr. Encarnacion should not be penalized in any way, shape or form for going to trial -- I think that is another evil of mandatory minimums and guidelines -- nevertheless, the Court now has a much fuller picture of what kind of person Mr. Encarnacion is, and it's not a particularly pretty picture.

Yes, it is true, the Court gives him full credit for the fact that he has no prior criminal convictions, that he has worked hard for years at two different jobs, that he has a supportive family and many other positive qualities that I don't wish to minimize at all, but I now recognize how willing a participant he was in each of the crimes of which he now stands convicted.

This was not, as defense counsel at times tries to argue -- eloquently but in the end unconvincingly to the Court -- someone who, if not as innocent as he proclaims, at least was dragged into something of which he was, at best, peripheral. The Court has no doubt -- and it was proven, in the Court's view, beyond all doubt -- that he was a very willing participant in every aspect of the crimes, the serious crimes, that he engaged in.

Nevertheless, I agree with the defense counsel that the government basically knew all this when they entered into their arrangement with him, and they felt -- and I think this is useful to the Court -- they felt that a sentence of 151 to

180-some months, which is what they would have asked for under the guilty plea arrangement, was sufficient to satisfy the purposes of Section 3553(a).

And while I agree with the government that, if you will, the vividness of some of the defendant's misconduct was brought home to everyone, including, I'm sure, the prosecutor and certainly the Court, by some of the evidence that came out at trial, and while Mr. Encarnacion's own testimony was, in the Court's view, blatantly false, nevertheless, the fact that the sentence that the government believed even at the time, just shortly before trial, that it entered into the proposal to allow him to plead to a guideline range of 151 to 180-something, is itself a factor the Court should weigh. It should weigh in particular because the Court does not wish to penalize any defendant for going to trial.

So, weighing all those things together, though part of me would impose a much heavier sentence, I'm going to impose a sentence of 180 months. Specifically, the sentence of the Court is that the defendant is sentenced to 180 months on Counts Two, Four and Six, to run concurrently with each other; he is sentenced to an additional 60 months on Count Three, to run concurrently with the other counts; so that the total term of imprisonment is 180 months.

He will be sentenced on all counts to three years of supervised release, on terms that I will get to in a moment.

No fine will be imposed because the Court makes the finding that this defendant is not in a position to pay any meaningful fine now or in the foreseeable future.

There is, however, a \$500 mandatory special assessment that must be paid.

The terms of supervised release are: First, the mandatory conditions that the defendant shall not commit any other federal, state or local crime; that the defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled substance; that the defendant shall not possess a firearm or a destructive device; that the defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit within 15 days of his placement on supervised release to one drug test, to be followed by two further drug tests, as directed by the probation officer; and that the defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA.

There will also be imposed the standard conditions of supervision 1 through 13. They appear on the face of the judgment and will be gone over with the defendant by the probation officer when the defendant begins his period of supervised release.

Finally, there are the special conditions: First, the defendant shall obey the immigration laws and comply with the directives of the immigration authorities; and, second, that the defendant within 72 hours of his release from prison will report to the nearest probation office to begin his period of

supervised release; and he will be supervised by the district of his residence.

Now, before I advise the defendant of his right of appeal, is there anything else either counsel wishes to raise with the Court?

MR. BOVE: Judge, with respect to supervised release, because the defendant was convicted of an object with respect to Count Two under 841(b)(1)(A), I believe the mandatory minimum term, even though that's is academic given the immigration consequences of the conviction, is five years.

THE COURT: Let me take a look. Hold on.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Yes, you're right. So I amend what I just said: So it will be five years of supervised release under the same terms and conditions previously mentioned, though, as you point out, given the immigration consequences, it's probably as a practical matter moot, but nevertheless it will be five years.

MR. BOVE: Thank you, Judge. Nothing else.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Judge, I think you skipped saying Count One.

THE COURT: Oh, no, no, no --

MR. BOVE: I think subsequently there was a mention of all counts, Judge, which I took to --

THE COURT: So everything I said about Count Two also

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applies to Count One. 1 2 Anything from the defense? MS. TODD: No, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: So, Mr. Encarnacion, you have the right to 4 appeal this sentence. Do you understand that? You have to 5 speak. 6 7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And if you can't afford counsel for the 8 appeal, the Court will appoint one for you free of charge. Do 9 you understand that? 10 11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 12 THE COURT: All right, very good. 13 MR. BOVE: Your Honor, before we conclude, the 14 government moves to dismiss all underlying counts and indictments. 15 THE COURT: Yes, that motion is granted. 16 Your Honor, one administrative thing: With 17 MS. TODD: the Court's authorization, I'd like to request a copy of the 18 sentencing minutes. 19 20 THE COURT: Yes, of course. Thank you. 21 MS. TODD: 22 (Adjourned) 23